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The Georgian historical narrative: From pre-Soviet to post-Soviet nationalism

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The Georgian historical master-narrative was formed at the end of the nineteenth century, in the era of the birth of Georgian nationalism. In confrontation with Russian imperial policy, Georgian history was transformed into the reconstruction and revival of Georgian ethnic identity. After imposition of Soviet rule in 1921, the Georgian master-narrative was readjusted according to the Marxist methodological framework, although it successfully confronted the official Soviet narrative. In the period of “perestroika” a general process of the revival of national identity was accompanied by growing interest in national history, and the Georgian master-narrative became more ethnocentric. The situation was aggravated by the conflicts of the early 1990s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It took some time to realize the importance of forming the feeling of national belonging regardless of ethnic, cultural or religious identity. At the end of the 1990s, reconfiguration of historical narratives and collective memories began in the history textbooks for secondary educational institutions. Nevertheless, the trajectory of historical narratives is not simple and the problem of inclusion of ethnic minorities in the history of Georgia still remains a significant issue.

Keywords: narrative; nationalism; history; identity; collective memory

This article presents the dynamics of the Georgian historical narrative from the creation of Georgian professional historiography to the post-Soviet era. I begin with the origins of the professional historical narrative in the era of formation of the Georgian nationalism, then examine the transformation of the Georgian narrative at the turn of the twentieth century. Discussion of the developments of the Soviet period lead to exploration of post-Soviet nationalism and the narrative formed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

“Tergdaleulebi”

In the 1860s, the young Georgians called “Tergdaleulebi” – in its literaral meaning denoting those who have drunk from the river Tergi/Terek, the traditional border between Georgia and Russia – were back to their homeland after graduating from leading Russian universities. As Stephen Jones mentions, in their search for a new Georgian identity, they “overturned the old world of aristocratic patriotism with

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explosive concepts of nationalism, equal rights, realism, scientific progress’’ (Jones, 2005, p. 303).

Ilia Chavchavadze was the most outstanding figure of the Tergdaleulebi. It could be said that exactly his personality was crucial in setting the contours, main directions and priorities of the national project formed in those days. The activities of the first generation of Tergdaleulebi and those of Ilia Chavchavadze fit in the first stage of the formation of nationalism as described by Miroslav Hroch (1999), comprised of the struggle for the formation of cultural identity, reformation of language and rise of interest towards the national history.

Ilia Chavchavadze considered history as one of the main tools for national consolidation. In one of his essays, Chavchavadze argued that:

Neither the common language nor the common faith and ancestry make the bonds between people as strong as the common history. (Chavchavadze, 1987, p. 165)

At the same time, the Tergdaleulebi’s “Combat for History” was not a struggle for the past, but rather the struggle for the creation of the future. As Chavchavadze wrote:

Let’s get over with the sorrow on the past, we should look for the new star and give a birth to the future. (Chavchavadze, 1959, p. 7)

Niko Nikoladze, another representative of the “Tergdaleulebi”, argued that:

History is a great lesson, but this does not necessarily mean that people should live only with the past. This is impossible and it will bring us to the collapse, and what is the most important, it is non-natural. (Nikoladze, 2006, p. 177)

The activities of the Tergdaleulebi contributed to the consolidation of the Georgian society. They brought together and tried to cement different parts of the country; they were now all united under the concept of “Georgia”. Relevant to the Soviet period to come, it is notable that different classes acknowledged their common identity as “Georgians”, an identity more important and fundamental than class identity.

Formation of the scientific historiography

Georgian scientific historiography was formed in the last decades of the nineteenth century, in the period of formation of Georgian nationalism. It was shaped in confrontation with Russian imperial policy, which was aimed at the reconstruction of the historical memory of Georgians according to imperial goals. In the face of imperial threat, Georgian history was transformed into the main hallmark for the reconstruction and revival of Georgian ethnic identity.

As in other similar cases, a nation was perceived vis-a-vis others, who were often constructed as “national enemies”. As Stephen Jones argues, Georgians referred to their distant past history to support claims of priority over Russian colonizers (Jones, 1994, p. 158). For Georgia, as for other countries of Central and South-Eastern Europe facing the need of ideological justification of the nation-state, the notion of ethnic exceptionalism became salient. Themes of suffering and repression
enabled Georgians to mark out a national history in opposition to an oppressive “other” (Berger, 2009, pp. 30–32).

Among the founders of Georgian historiography, Ivane Javakhishvili is the most outstanding figure. In his work *Patriotism and science*, published in 1904, he offered his view of history, setting its main target and purpose as science as well as stressing its role in the formation of identity. Here is how Javakhishvili framed the working principles of professional historian.

For every educated nation with self-perception, it is necessary to be aware of the history of the past social life; arguably, it should be the knowledge of the true history and not that of the exaggerated, false one. (Javakhishvili, 1904, p. 13)

A historian is responsible for the scientific study and exploration of the past of a nation ... A historian should be impartial in the study of the past of his nation and he should be an equally impartial presenter of its results to his counterparts and foreigners. (Javakhishvili, 1904, p. 4)

According to Javakhishvili, sometimes the version of history in which the “dignities are glorified and defects are diminished” is judged by patriotic feeling and love towards the motherland. However, the authors of such an approach are oriented towards the past in an unhealthy way.

Whatever great merits a nation could have had in the past, if it is faked in the present, the glorious past could hardly help it. (Javakhishvili, 1904, p. 11)

Ivane Javakhishvili’s exact perspective became a master-narrative that determined the main directions of development of the new historical science. His work set a kind of draft plan for later historians. Similar to other cases where a professional history was formed as a response to an imperial challenge, the Georgian master-narrative had an ethno-centric character; it represented the history of ethnic Georgians. Although Javakhishvili placed Georgia within the wider context of the Caucasus and the Middle East, different ethnic groups residing in Georgia were not represented. The scientific history narrative was aimed at strengthening the identity of Georgians; therefore, history should depict their difference from “others” – inside of the country as well as outside.

**Soviet period**

Imposition of Soviet rule in 1921 brought significant changes into the professional historical narrative. The nationality policy of the Soviet Union was aimed at the formation of a common Soviet identity. The contradictory character of the soviet nationality policy should be stressed: the state took care of the development of local cultures and identities of nations, nationalities and peoples who should mingle in the “Soviet family”. On the one hand, the ethnic belonging of Soviet citizens was determined by their birth and was not expected to change; on the other hand, ethnic belonging was declared a temporary category that should wither away over time. As Yuri Slezkine puts it, “The world’s first state of workers and peasants was the first state of institutionalized ethno-territorial federalism, classifying all citizens according to their nationalities” (Slezkine, 1994, p. 415).

This stage of the Soviet nationality policy lasted up to the mid 1930s, when the policy of “nativizatsia”–“korenizatsia” and linguistic indigenization was replaced by the policy of *rapprochement* of the nations. The aim of the formation of the single
Soviet people was particularly stressed. The Soviet culture – national in form and socialist in content – should serve as its basis, becoming the sphere of special state concern.

History was perceived as one of the essential instruments for the formation of common Soviet identity. The main and only accepted discourse of history research was Marxist historical materialism with an accent on class struggle and ascending social-economic formations. Marxism–Leninist methodology became obligatory for historians beginning from the 1930s. History was considered to be the weapon of propaganda, being strictly ideologized. From 1922, teaching of the “History of Georgia” was abolished at schools and at Tbilisi University. A new subject, “History of Class Struggle”, was introduced at all secondary educational institutions. At higher educational institutions the “History of Georgia” was replaced by the “History of the Civil War in the USSR”.

However, the attempt to introduce the history of class struggle failed, and the process of re-writing national histories from the Marxist–Leninist materialist perspective was started and encouraged. The issues of class struggle and changes in modes of production were stressed. In 1929, the term “history of the peoples of the USSR” was announced to be obligatory for all historians of the USSR (Velychenko, 1994, p. 21).

In December 1930, at a special session held at Tbilisi University – which was founded by Ivane Javakhishvili and was already “reorganized” by Bolsheviks – Javakhishvili’s work was re-assessed. According to one of the organizers of the session, Javakhishvili was “the representative of the old, feudal-nationalist country; he was characterized as methodologically creeping empiricist and anti-Marxist . . . the history written by Iv. Javakhishvili is not a history in the scientific sense . . . there is a set-back, rather than advancement in his creation” (Metreveli, 2009, p. 323).

In 1934, “Remarks on the History of the USSR” was published under the joint authorship of J. Stalin, A. Zhdanov and S. Kirov. In this essay, the authors called for the “History of the USSR” – with no reference to “peoples” in the title. It was the first use of this term that continued salient until the end of the USSR. Starting from this publication, Soviet history became more and more Russo-centric, minimizing differences, justifying Russian colonization and annexation, stressing the voluntary unification of all peoples with Russia.

From this point on, the “History of the USSR” became the main subject of study and research. It reflected the common past of all the peoples of the Soviet Union, although mainly the history of Russia with an insignificant mixture of the other peoples’ histories.

Study and teaching of “World History” were also allowed, although always based on the Marxist paradigm of the class struggle. Ancient and Medieval history became a kind of shelter for historians as the control of authorities over these fields was relatively weak. National history was not forbidden (it was even promoted in some cases) if placed in the framework of the common Soviet history. “History of Georgia” in secondary schools was integrated into the curricula and supported with textbooks approved by the Union Ministry of Education.

The Georgian master-narrative of the hard and heroic past was mainly maintained, although readjusted according to the Marxist methodological framework. Just as in other Communist countries, the Marxist framework of history writing was combined with the propagation of national characteristics (Berger, 2009, p. 31). The “gallery of heroes” was filled with the new personages who had “emerged
out of the people”. According to variation in political and ideological purposes, attitudes would change towards particular heroes as well as towards relevant facts and events.

Oversimplified narration in the form of “good–bad” opposition was gradually developed into clichés, appearing in textbooks and in scientific editions from year to year. These clichés were aimed at forging simplified thinking and excluding questions about different kinds and directions of development.

However, the Soviet nationality policy was only partially successful in limiting or shaping the dominant myths and memories of non-Russians. As Stephen Jones mentions, ironically, the Soviet state strengthened the counter-histories by providing the vehicles for their propagation, such as national literatures, folklore societies and museums. As in other authoritarian societies, the emotive potential of national history remained strong in Georgia (Velychenko, 1994, p.17). It could be said that the national history successfully confronted the official Soviet narrative in Soviet Georgia. On the other hand, ethno-territorial institutionalization and cultivation of national political, economic and cultural elites appeared as a foundation for inter-ethnic tensions by the second half of the 1980s.

**Perestroika**

In the period of “perestroika” a general process of the revival of national identity was accompanied by growing interest towards national history. Already from the mid 1980s the history of Georgia had become a compulsory course for secondary as well as higher educational institutions. Filling in the “white spots” of history and the re-creation of the “true history” became the main task for the historiography. A great deal of factual material, covering themes that had been forbidden in the Soviet time, appeared in the narrative. These were mainly issues of modern history: political movements of the beginning of the twentieth century, political parties formed in Georgia, their programs and leaders, developments from February 1917 to May 1918, detailed history of the Georgian Democratic Republic, struggle against the Soviet regime in the 1920s–1930s, and Soviet political repressions. The names of the political and public figures of the period of the Georgian Democratic Republic, as well as those of Soviet political leaders and intelligentsia who became victims of the Soviet repressions, leaders of anti-Soviet uprisings and the rebellion of 1924 in particular, appeared in the narrative for the first time. The reassessment of concrete events began, although with caution, avoiding radical conclusions.

Since the end of 1980s, with the easing of constraints, the master-narrative became more ethno-centric. In this period, the struggle for national rights took a political overtone. This was followed with the sharpening of the “Combat for History”, which started at the beginning of the twentieth century and was later stamped with the legacy of the Soviet nationality policy. The Georgian master-narrative was confronted by Abkhazian and South Ossetian counter-narratives. The Georgian narrative was centered on the problem of the ethnic origins of Abkhazians. In this line, the theory of the Georgian scholar Pavle Ingorokhva, formulated in the mid twentieth century, was activated. It represented Abkhazians as non-indigenous population of the South Caucasus and considered them to be inhabited on the “Georgian” territory considerably later.

In opposition to this view, Abkhazian historians stressed that Abkhazians were living on the territory of Abkhazia from time immemorial; later on they were
assimilated by Georgians. The policy of “Georgianization” promoted by Stalin and Beria, aimed at the demographic and cultural assimilation of Abkhazians, became the central point of the Abkhazian nationalism. The Georgian political centre and ethnic Georgian leaders of the Kremlin were represented as the main oppressors and victimizers. Georgians were blamed for “taking away Abkhazian’s memory”.

Referring to the past and creating parallel histories, Georgians and Abkhazians were trying to justify territorial claims. They were competing for one and the same historical resources and blaming each other for capturing history. Thus, by the end of the 1980s, Georgians and Abkhazians were formed as different “mnemonic entities” (Toria, 2006, pp. 23–36).

As for the South Ossetian narrative, it was framed around the events of 1918–1921. In Soviet historiography, the uprising of Ossetians in northern Georgia in 1919 was interpreted as a popular revolt against the Menshevik oppressors. Georgian historians evaluated the uprising as the subversive prelude for Sovietization in 1921. The image of Ossetians as migrated people who became the reliable collaborators of foreign (Russian) aggressors was set. The Ossetian national narrative presented the conflict as an attempt of the Georgian government to conduct genocide against Ossetian people (Khinchagashvili, 2008, p. 28).

These competing narratives were strengthened and activated as a result of the developments of the 1980s, especially by the events of April 1989 in Tbilisi. April demonstrations were triggered by the “Likhni Declaration” – a collective address to Moscow by Abkhazian political leaders and intelligentsia, and their supporters – demanding separation from Georgia. This demand was followed by the strengthening of the anti-Abkhazian rhetoric by the Georgian political leaders called “informals” at that time.

Thus, the themes of national guilt, victimization by “other”, historical justice and historical truth became central for the nationalist rhetoric and national narratives in Georgia at the end of the 1980s.

Post-Soviet period

Deconstruction and reconsideration of the past started in Georgia after the dissolution of the USSR. National history emerged as an integral part of the nation-building process. As elsewhere in periods of crisis, history was addressed for the answers to current questions. Although the methodological constraints disappeared, the inertia of the past had quite a strong influence on future developments. The traditional mono-methodological Marxist approach made the task of historian easier as it equipped him with the sole possible discourse of interpretation, which is why it was not abandoned enthusiastically. Difficulties and sometimes even the lack of will to comprehend new theoretical approaches may be observed during this period.

Emancipation from Marxist ideological discourse was an important goal for the post-Soviet historiography, but it did not turn out to be an easy task. Instead of the de-ideologization, the communist ideology was replaced by the unqualified or para-patriotic narrative (Reisner, 1998, p. 414).

As Ronald Suny noted, at the end of the Soviet period ethno-nationalism became an ultimate ideological choice for the titular nations of the Soviet republics (Suny, 1999/2000, p. 159). Similar to the experience of other post-communist countries, Georgian history became even more ethno-centric in the 1990s. A sudden shift took
place, from one “correct” history (where everything was evaluated from the aspect of the class struggle) to another “correct” one (where everything was interpreted from the perspective of the Georgian people) (Gundare, 2007).

As expected, in terms of the reconsideration of history, the public discourse was much more active than professional historians. Ultra-patriotic sentiments appeared in the public speeches of political leaders, printed media, TV. The paradigm of victimhood re-emerged and was strengthened by stressing the facts of constant attacks and threats of aggression from neighbors. The principle of “autochthonous population” became the subject of manipulation. Portions of political parties started to talk about the “guests”; residence of different ethnic groups on the territory of Georgia was declared as a result of tolerance of the titular nation; meanwhile, the notion of “ungratefulness” was set.

Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s exclusivist nationalist discourse aggravated the tensions between the different ethnic groups. In a 1990 article with the remarkable title The spiritual mission of Georgia (Gamsakhurdia, 1990), the topic of indigenousness and status of the settlers and “newcomers” were discussed. The contradictory character of attitude toward “others” – non-Georgian citizens of the country – should be mentioned. In his different speeches and interviews, Gamsakhurdia particularly stressed the necessity of protecting ethnic minority rights. Nevertheless, in other appeals he stressed the special rights of the titular nation.

The special law should be enacted which will limit the uncontrolled migration and the demographic expansion of the alien nations in Georgia. Meantime, the rights of national minorities should not be neglected, who are legally residing on the territory of Georgia and contribute to the struggle of the Georgian nation for freedom and independence. (Speech of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 1990)

Different approaches towards Abkhazians and Ossetians could be noticed in the political discourse of this time. The acknowledgment of the political rights of Abkhazians and the issue of maintenance of their autonomous status have not been questioned, due to the fact that Abkhazians have no other motherland outside Georgia (Speech of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, 1991); whereas the pretenses of Ossetians on autonomy were perceived as separatism and termed as the offense. The right of Ossetians on self-determination was acknowledged, but it should be exercised on the territory of their historical motherland – North Ossetia.

Some of the activists of ethnic minorities were no less radical in their political rhetoric, using the concept of “historical lands”. A tendency similar to that of the Georgian nationalist discourse was revealed in the narratives of ethnic minorities. Mutual blaming for falsification of “historical truth” has appeared. Consequently, difference was constructed negatively as an exclusion and marginalization of those who were defined as “other” or “outsider” (Woodward, 1997, p. 35).

As for the professional historical narrative, it reflected the above-mentioned tendency rather moderately. The traditional conservativeness of the academy played a positive role in this case: academic historians had difficulty giving up not only the old methodological framework, but the traditional narrative of the Soviet period as well.

The situation was aggravated by the conflicts of the early 1990s in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. They were preceded and accompanied by the contested memories/history wars: motives, aspirations and actions of the confronted sides were narrated differently by the conflicting parties, based on myths, stereotypes, preconceptions
and prejudices formed over a long period of time. The experience of coexistence and shared history was suppressed, as the conflicts were followed by the rule of the post-conflict traumatic memory.

It took some time to realize the importance of overcoming the conflicting memory and forming the feeling of national belonging regardless of ethnic, cultural or religious identity. At the end of the 1990s, reconfiguration of historical narratives and collective memories began in the history textbooks for secondary educational institutions. It should be stressed that by this time, there were no remarkable changes in the master-narrative; hence, the history textbooks could not be built on the novelties offered by the academia.

The first step was made after 1997, when the necessity of establishing the “pluralistic–alternative teaching of history” was stressed for the very first time in the Law of Education. However, the textbooks did not reflect this intention fully. The new Law of Education adopted in 2005 more thoroughly addressed a challenge of civic integration. The third generation of the post-Soviet Georgian history textbooks represents the first attempt on the way of overcoming an ethnocentric vision of history. Georgia is portrayed as a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country, shaped over centuries. The tone of the textbooks became more neutral, attempts being made to keep some distance from the historical events, including those of the 1990s. Georgians are no more represented as victims of external forces. The textbooks are mostly cleared up from the ethnic and religious stereotypes.

The attempt of planting the multi-perspective approach appears to be having some success. History is shown as a science based on interpretation. Nevertheless, the problem of inclusion of ethnic minorities in the history of Georgia still remains a significant issue. The impression is that these groups reside separately, not interacting with each other. Their participation in the common past is mentioned, but the statement is not supported with facts.

The issues of the history of Abkhazians and Ossetians are the most painful and unresolved problems for the history textbooks and historiography in general. Interpretations of history by the Georgian, Abkhazian and Ossetian historians are radically different, and these differences are reflected in the respective history textbooks. For analysis of the above-mentioned contradictions, see Kakitelashvili (2010).

The additional problem in relation to conflicting memory emerged out of the strained relations with the Russian Federation. The Russian–Georgian War of August 2008 actualized the concept of the “other” which was assigned the attributes of historical enemy. After the war, the issue of Russian colonization and the theme of occupation of Georgia became topical in the Georgian historiography.

Conclusion

The formation of contested histories and conflicting memories in Georgia has passed through several stages from pre- to post-Soviet nationalism. The Georgian master-narrative was formed at the end of the nineteenth century, in the era of the birth of the Georgian nationalism. In the Soviet time, it successfully confronted the official Soviet narrative. Historiography served as a tool of preserving the national memory/identity. In the period of “perestroika”, the combat for history sharpened and mutually exclusive narratives of the different ethnic groups appeared and paved the way to the “wars of memories”. In the post-Soviet period, the collective memory of conflicts complicated the process of reconfiguration of the historical narratives. Still,
the process of overcoming conflicting narratives began after the painful experience of the violent conflicts. The trajectory of historical narratives is not simple and will continue to be affected by contradictory political developments in Georgia.

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